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Abstract—We derive bounds on the expected loss for authenti-
cation protocols in channels which are constrained due to noisy
conditions and communication costs. This is motivated by a
number of authentication protocols, where at least some part
of the authentication is performed during a phase, lasting n
rounds, with no error correction. This requires assigning an
acceptable threshold for the number of detected errors and
taking into account the cost of incorrect authentication and
of communication. This paper describes a framework enabling
an expected loss analysis for all the protocols in this family.
Computationally simple methods to obtain nearly optimal values
for the threshold, as well as for the number of rounds are
suggested and upper bounds on the expected loss, holding
uniformly, are given. These bounds are tight, as shown by a
matching lower bound. Finally, a method to adaptively select
both the number of rounds and the threshold is proposed for a
certain class of protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally [1], [2], authentication is assumed to be taking
place on an error-free channel, and error analysis is performed
separately from cryptographic analysis of protocols. However,
a number of authentication protocols have been proposed [3]–
[11], where at least some part of the authentication is per-
formed during a challenge-response phase lasting n rounds
with no error correction, due to a need to detect relay attacks
by timing delays. The noise necessitates the acceptance of
some responses which are not perfectly correct. In addition,
increasing n carries a significant cost. The problem is to strike
an optimal balance between the increased number of rounds,
the probability of falsely authenticating an illegitimate party,
and failing to authenticate a legitimate party.
For example the rapid-bit exchange phase in an RFID
distance-bounding protocol (i.e. [9]), satisfies these criteria.
The phase lasts n rounds, where an equal number of challenges
and responses are sent. Since there is no error correction
during that phase, some responses of a legitimate user may be
erroneous. This necessitates the use of a tolerance threshold
τ , such that if the number of erroneous responses is lower
than τ , the communicating party is nevertheless authenticated.
In addition, while increasing the number of rounds decreases
the probability of incorrect authentication, it also increases
communication costs. The problem then is how to select n, τ
in an optimal manner.
This paper1 performs an expected loss analysis of the
authentication problem. This is necessary, because of the non-
trivial cost of increasing the number of rounds n, the lack
of an error-free channel and the need to trade off optimally
the costs of incorrectly authenticating an illegitimate entity, or
failing to authenticate a legitimate one.
We place the problem in a decision-theoretic framework. We
assign a loss ℓA to the event that we authenticate a malicious
party A—which we call the attacker—a loss ℓU to the event
that we fail to authenticate a valid party U—which we call the
user—and a loss ℓB for each round of the challenge-response
phase, such that the total communication cost is nℓB . Adding
a non-negligible cost to the communications is of fundamental
importance in resource-constrained environments. Otherwise,
n can be made as large as necessary to make the probability
of authentication mistakes infinitesimal. Our goal is to select
n and τ so as to minimise the expected loss EL of the
authentication system. This is achieved through a finite sample
analysis.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces
notation and our framework. Section III contains the expected
loss analysis under noise. In particular, Sec. III-A suggests
a method to calculate the threshold accompanied by finite
sample upper loss bounds and a matching lower bound, while
Sec. III-B provides a further loss bound by selecting an
near-optimal number of rounds n. These results only require
two reasonable assumptions: that the expected error of the
attacker is higher than that of the user and that the errors are
independent in each round, something that can be achieved
by appropriate protocol design. Section IV applies the above
analysis to a number of currently used protocols. Section V
suggests a high-probability method for estimating the channel
noise and presents the results of simulation experiments that
compare our choice of threshold with other approaches, based
on thresholds derived using asymptotic approximations. Fi-
nally, Sec. VI concludes the paper with a discussion of related
work. For completeness, the appendix provides some useful
auxiliary results regarding the finite sample and the asymptotic
derivations.
1Preliminary versions of this paper were published as arXiv:1009.0278 [12].
2II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider sequences x = x1, . . . , xn with all xi in some
alphabet X and x ∈ Xn. We write X ∗ , ⋃∞n=0 Xn for
the set of all sequences. We use , to indicate a definition.
P(A) denotes the probability of event A, while E denotes
expectations so that E(X | A) = ∑u∈Ω uP(X = u | A)
denotes the conditional expectation of a random variable
X ∈ Ω when A is true. Finally, I {A} is an indicator function
equal to 1 when A is true and 0 otherwise.
We consider additive-error challenge-response authentica-
tion protocols. In such protocols, a verifier V grants access
to a prover P , if the latter can demonstrate its identity
via possession of a shared secret. The protocol has three
phases: (i) An initialisation phase. (ii) A challenge-response
phase, lasting n rounds, performed without error correction
under noisy conditions. (iii) A termination phase. During the
challenge-response phase the verifier V sends n challenges
c1, . . . , cn, with ck ∈ X , to the prover P , which responds
by transmitting n responses r1, . . . , rn, with rk ∈ X . We
use c = (ck)
n
k=1, and r = (rk)nk=1 to denote the complete
challenge and response sequences respectively. The verifier V
uses an error function E : X ×X → [0, 1] to calculate an error
εi = E(ri, ci) for the i-th round. The errors when interacting
with a valid user may be non-zero due to noise constraints in
the channel. However, as the attacker has to resort to guessing
the responses, the expected error of the attacker should be
higher than that of the user.
In order to trade off false acceptances with false rejections,
we use a threshold value τ , such that a prover is accepted
if and only if the total error observed is smaller than τ . The
verifier V calculates the total error ε , ∑ni=1 εi, and rejects
the prover P , if and only if ε ≥ τ .
The relation of ε to the challenge and response strings c
and r strongly depends on the protocol. In order to make
our analysis generally applicable, we make the following
assumption about the protocol.
Assumption 1. We assume there exists some pA ≤ E(εi | A),
a lower bound on the expected per-round error of the attacker
and some pU ≥ E(εi | U), an upper bound on the error of
a legitimate user. In addition, we assume that the protocol
is such that all errors are independently (but not necessarily
identically) distributed.
These bounds depend on the noise during the challenge-
response phase and on the protocol under consideration. We
shall return to them in section IV.
III. EXPECTED LOSS ANALYSIS
We now specify our potential losses. For every round of the
challenge-response phase, we suffer loss ℓB , due to the cost
in time and energy of transmission. In addition, we suffer a
loss of ℓA for each false acceptance and a loss ℓU for each
false rejection.2 Given that we perform n rounds, the total
2These losses are subjectively set to application-dependent values. Clearly,
for cases where falsely authenticating an attacker the impact is severe, ℓA
must be much greater than ℓU .
loss when the prover P is either the legitimate user U or the
attacker A is given by:
L =


nℓB + ℓU , if ε ≥ τ and P = U
nℓB + ℓA, if ε < τ and P = A
nℓB , otherwise.
(1)
Armed with this information, we can now embark upon an
expected loss analysis. We wish to devise an algorithm that
guarantees an upper bound on the expected loss EL of the
authentication system. To start with, we note that the expected
loss when the communicating party is an attacker A or the user
U , is given respectively by:
E(L | A) = nℓB + P(ε < τ | A) · ℓA + P(ε ≥ τ | A) · 0 (2)
E(L | U) = nℓB + P(ε < τ | U) · 0 + P(ε ≥ τ | U) · ℓU (3)
The expected loss is in either case bounded by the worst-case
expected loss:
L , max {E(L | A),E(L | U)} ≥ EL (4)
If we can find an expression that bounds both E(L | A) and
E(L | U), we automatically obtain a bound on the expected
loss, EL.
A. Choice of threshold
We want a threshold τ such that no matter whether the
prover P is the attacker A or the legitimate user U the expected
loss E(L | P) is as small as possible. As we increase the
threshold τ , E(L | P = U) decreases, while E(L | P = A)
increases and vice-versa. Intuitively, to minimise the worst-
case expected loss, we can use τ such that E(L | P = A, τ) =
E(L | P = U, τ). A threshold τ minimising an upper bound
on the worst-case expected loss is given in Theorem 1. As
an intermediate step, we obtain a bound on the worst-case
expected loss for any given threshold τ . Formally, we can
show the following:
Lemma 1. Let εi ∈ [0, 1] be the error of the i-th round. If, for
all i > 0, it holds that E(εi | A) ≥ pA and E(εi | U) ≤ pU ,
for some pA, pU ∈ [0, 1] such that npU ≤ τ ≤ npA, then:
L(n; τ) , nℓB +max
{
e−
2
n
(npU−τ)
2
ℓU , e
− 2
n
(npA−τ)
2
ℓA
}
≥ max {E(L | A),E(L | U)} ≥ EL (5)
Proof: The expected loss when P = A, is simply:
E(L | A) = nℓB + P
(∑
i
εi < τ
∣∣∣ A
)
ℓA
≤ nℓB + P
(∑
i
εi − nE(εi | A) < τ − npA
∣∣∣ A
)
ℓA
≤ nℓB + e− 2n (npA−τ)
2
ℓA,
the last two steps used the fact that E(εi | A) ≥ pA and the
Hoeffding inequality (18). Specifically, in our case, Lemma 3
(page 7) applies with Xi = ǫi. Then, it is easy to see that
3µi = E(εi | A) for all i and bi − ai = 1, so P(ǫ < npA +
nt | A) ≤ e−2nt2 . By setting τ = npA + nt, we obtain
t = (τ−npA)/n, which we can plug into the above inequality,
thus arriving at the required result.
The other case, P = U , is handled similarly and we
conclude that E(L | U) ≤ nℓB + e− 2n (npU−τ)2ℓU .
The given upper bound is tight, as can be seen by the
following lemma, which proves a matching lower bound for
the example of Bernoulli-distributed errors.
Lemma 2. Modifying our assumptions slightly, let εi ∈ {0, 1}
be the Bernoulli-distributed error of the i-th round, such that,
for all i > 0, it holds that P(εi | A) = pA and P(εi | U) = pU ,
for some pA, pU ∈ [0, 1] such that npU ≤ τ ≤ npA, then:
EL ≥ min {E(L | A),E(L | U)}
≥ nℓB +
(n
τ
)τ
min
{
ℓAp
τ
A(1− pA)n−τ , ℓUpτU (1− pU )n−τ
}
(6)
Proof: The expected loss when P = U , is simply:
E(L | U) = nℓB + P
(∑
i
εi ≥ τ
∣∣∣ U
)
ℓU
≥ nℓB + P
(∑
i
εi = τ
∣∣∣ U
)
ℓU
= nℓB +
(
n
τ
)
pτU (1− pU )n−τ ℓU
≥ nℓB +
(npU
τ
)τ
(1− pU )n−τ ℓU
The other case, P = A, is handled similarly and we conclude
that E(L | A) ≥ nℓB +
(
npA
τ
)τ
(1− pA)n−τ ℓA
To see that the upper and lower bounds match, consider that
P = U and τ = nc with c < 1. Then Lemmas 1 and 2 give
us:
nℓB + e
− 2
n
(npU−τ)
2
ℓU ≥ nℓB +
(npU
τ
)τ
(1− pU )n−τ ℓU
e−
2
n
(npU−τ)
2 ≥
(npU
τ
)τ
(1− pU )n−τ
e−2(pU−c)
2n ≥ e[c ln pUc +(1−c) ln(1−pU )]n
Thus, the upper and lower bounds given for the expected loss
(EL) are of the same order with regard to n.
Having bounded the loss suffered when choosing a specific
threshold, we now choose a threshold τˆ∗n that minimises the
above bound for fixed n. In fact, we can show that such a
threshold results in a particular upper bound on the expected
loss.
Theorem 1. Let ρ , ℓA/ℓU and select
τ = τˆ∗n ,
n(pA + pU )
2
− ln ρ
4∆
(7)
If npU ≤ τ ≤ npA, then the expected loss EL is bounded by:
E(L | n, τˆ∗n) ≤ L1(n) , nℓB + e−
n
2∆
2 ·
√
ℓAℓU . (8)
with ∆ , pA − pU .
Proof: Substitute (7) in the first exponential of (5) to
obtain:
e−
2
n
(npU−τˆ
∗)2ℓU = e
−n2∆
2
e−
ln2 ρ
8n∆2
√
ℓAℓU .
It is easy to see that the exact same result is obtained by
substituting (7) in the second exponential of (5). Thus, both
E(L | A) and E(L | U) are bounded by the same quantity and
consequently, so is max {E(L | A),E(L | U)}. Thus,
L(n, τˆ∗n) ≤ nℓB + e−
n
2∆
2√
ℓAℓU ,
where we simplified the bound by noting that ln
2 ρ
8n∆2 > 0.
The intuition behind the algorithm and the analysis is that
it is possible to bound the probability that A makes less errors
than expected, or that U makes more than expected. For this
reason, the τˆ∗n chosen in the theorem must lie between npU
and npA. This also implies a lower bound on the number of
rounds n.
B. Choice of the number of rounds
Using similar techniques to those employed for obtaining
a suitable value for the threshold, we now indicate a good
choice for the number of rounds n and provide a matching
bound on the expected loss.
Theorem 2. Assume ℓA, ℓU , ℓB > 0. If we choose τ = τˆ∗n and
n = nˆ∗ ,
√
1 + 2CK − 1
C
, (9)
where C = ∆2 and K =
√
ℓAℓU/ℓB , then the expected loss
EL is bounded by:
E(L | τˆ∗n, nˆ∗) ≤ L2 ,
√
8K/C · ℓB =
√
8ℓB(ℓAℓU )
1/4
∆
.
(10)
Proof: We shall bound each one of the summands of (8)
by
√
2K/C · ℓB . For the first term we have:
nℓB =
√
1 + 2CK − 1
C
ℓB ≤
√
1 + 2CK
C
ℓB
≤
√
2CK
C
ℓB =
√
2K
C
ℓB .
For the second term, by noting that ex ≥ 1 + x, we have:√
ℓU ℓA · e−n2∆
2 ≤
√
ℓU ℓA
1 + n2∆
2
=
KℓB
1 + nC2
=
2KℓB
1 +
√
1 + 2CK
≤ 2KℓB√
1 + 2CK
≤ 2KℓB√
2CK
=
√
2K
C
ℓB .
Summing the two bounds, we obtain the required result.
This theorem proves that our worst-case expected loss L
grows sublinearly both with increasing round cost (with rate
O(ǫ1/2)) and with increasing authentication costs (with rate
O(ǫ1/4)). Furthermore, the expected loss is bounded symmet-
rically for both user and attacker access. Finally, there is a
strong dependence on the margin ∆ between the attacker and
the user error rates, which is an expected result.
4IV. ANALYSIS OF RFID THRESHOLDED PROTOCOLS
Currently, the most well-known protocols employing an
authentication phase without any error correction and under
resource constraints are RFID distance bounding protocols.
For that reason, we shall examine the properties of two such
protocols, for which it is possible to derive expressions for
pA, pU , given a symmetric channel noise.
More precisely, due to noise in the physical medium, in any
exchange between V and P , the former may send a symbol x ∈
X , while the latter may receive a symbol xˆ ∈ X such that x 6=
xˆ. We shall denote the probability of erroneous transmission in
the data layer as: ω , P(xˆ = j | x 6= j, x 6= xˆ). For simplicity,
we shall only treat the case of symmetric channel noise such
that: P(xˆ = y | x 6= y) = 1|X |−1 , ∀y 6= x, x, y ∈ X .
The SWISS-KNIFE protocol [11] and the variant HITOMI [7]
are additive-error authentication protocols satisfying our as-
sumptions. It is easy to show (for details see [7]) that, for
those two protocols, under channel noise ω, the expected error
bounds pA, pU are given by: pA = ω+12 , pU = 2ω, where we
note in passing that pA ≥ pU and so ω ≤ 13 . Finally, by
substituting ∆ = pA − pU = 1−3ω2 in (8), we obtain the
following bound for SWISS-KNIFE and HITOMI:
EL ≤ nℓB + e−
n(1−3ω)2
8 ·
√
ℓAℓU , (11)
We have performed a number of experiments to test the
efficacy of these protocols, when used in conjunction with our
suggested, as well as the optimal values of the threshold and
number of rounds. In all of the experiments shown here, we
chose the following values for the losses: ℓA = 10, ℓU = 1,
ℓB = 10
−2
.
Figure 1(a) depicts the bound (11) on the expected loss, as
well as the actual EL calculated via the binomial formula,
when the threshold τˆ∗n , calculated from (7), is used. We plot
both the expected loss and the bound for two different channel
noise levels ω ∈ {10−1, 10−2}, where the number of rounds
n varies from 1 to 256. Obviously, the bound is greater than
the actual expected loss, while it approaches it exponentially
fast as n increases. In addition, the losses are higher when the
amount of noise increases.
Furthermore, we can see that there are minimising values
of n for all cases. While they do not coincide for the bound
and the actual expected loss, they are within a factor of two of
each other. Finally, nˆ∗, the value of n minimising the bound,
is always greater than n∗ , argminnmaxP∈A,U E(L | P, n),
the value of n that minimises the worst-case expected loss.
Since the probability of incorrect authentication always de-
creases with increasing n, this implies that any additional
losses incurred by using nˆ∗ is due to transmission costs only.
Figure 1(b) examines the effect of noise in more detail.
In particular, it depicts the worst-case expected loss for the
optimal number of rounds n∗, denoted by E(L | n∗) in the
legend. This is of course smaller than E(L | nˆ∗), the loss
suffered by choosing nˆ∗, with the gap becoming smaller for
larger error rates. Since when this occurs, the expected loss is
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(b) The worst-case expected Loss L and the bounds L1 and L2 from
theorems 1 and 2 respectively vs. the channel error rate ω.
Fig. 1. Comparison of all losses.
very close to L1, this implies that the bound of the Theorem 1
can be further tightened for small ω.
V. ESTIMATING ω
In this section, we discuss how it is possible to calculate
the channel error rate ω, which is used in the expressions for
pA, pU . This can be done by leveraging the coding performed
during the initial and final phases of the protocol. We assume
some coding function Φ : Xm → X k, with k > m, and
a metric γ on X k (where usually X = {0, 1} and γ is the
Hamming distance) such that:
γmin , min {γ(Φ(x),Φ(y)) : x, y ∈ Xm, x 6= y} (12)
is the minimum (Hamming) distance between valid codewords.
For a given x ∈ Xm, the source transmits φ = Φ(x) and the
sink receives φˆ, with φ, φˆ ∈ Xn. As before, we assume that the
physical channel has a symmetric error rate ω = P(φˆi 6= φi),
where φi denotes the i-th bit of φ. This is then decoded as
xˆ , argmin
{
γ(φˆ,Φ(y)) : y ∈ Xm
}
. Let θ be the number of
5errors in the string φˆ, or more precisely θ = γ(φ, φˆ). Let θˆ ,
γ(Φ(xˆ), φˆ) be the distance between the closest valid codeword
Φ(xˆ) and the received φˆ. If θ < (γmin − 1)/2, then θ = θˆ.
The crux of our method for estimating ω relies on the
number of errors θ being less than (γmin−1)/2, in which case,
the estimated number of errors θˆ will equal θ. Let ωˆ , θˆn be
our empirical error rate. In that case, the expected empirical
error rate equals the true error rate. More formally:
E (ωˆ | θ ≤ (γmin − 1)/2) = ω. (13)
If θ > (γmin − 1)/2 then the protocol fails in any case, due
to decoding errors in the initial or final phases. If not, then
the above equation holds and we can obtain high probability
bounds for ω via the Hoeffding inequality (Appendix, Lemma
3). In particular, it is easy to show that, for any δ ∈ [0, 1]:
P
(
|ωˆ − ω| ≥
√
ln 2/δ
2k
)
≤ δ, (14)
by substituting the square-root term into (18), and setting µi =
ω,
∑
Xi = θˆ, ai = 0, bi = 1. Consequently, for the SWISS-
KNIFE family of protocols the following values for pA and
pU hold with probability 1− δ:
pA =
1 + ωˆ
2
+
√
ln 2/δ
8k
, pU = 2ωˆ −
√
2 ln 2/δ
k
. (15)
Experimental investigations presented in the next section in-
dicate that this choice has good performance in terms of
expected loss.
A. Evaluation Experiments
We have performed some experiments to evaluate our
methods in a more realistic setting, involving an RFID dis-
tance bounding protocol with a rapid-bit exchange phase. We
perform simulations for two cases: Firstly, when a legitimate
user U is trying to get authenticated and secondly, when an
adversary A is trying to perform a mafia fraud attack [13].
We have estimated the worst-case expected loss by running
104 experiments for each case, obtaining a pair of estimates
Eˆ(L | A), Eˆ(L | U) by averaging the loss L, as defined in
(1), incurred in each experiment and taking the maximum of
the two. In all of the experiments shown in this section, we
chose the following values for the losses: ℓA = 10, ℓU = 1,
ℓB = 10
−2
, while we used k = 210 for the coded messages
in the initialisation phase.
The actual values pA, pU depend on ω, which is unknown.
We compare three methods for choosing pA, pU . Firstly,
guessing a value ωˆ for the channel noise. Secondly, using the
maximum likelihood noise estimate ωˆ = θˆ/k. In both cases,
we simply use ωˆ as described at the beginning of Sec. IV to
obtain pA, pU . In the third case, we use the high-probability
bounds (15) for pA, pU , with an arbitrary value of δ.
In the first experiment, we use the nearly-optimal threshold
and number of rounds that we have derived in our analysis. In
the second experiment, we replace our choice of threshold with
a choice similar to that of Baigne`res et al. [14]. Their threshold
is derived via a likelihood ratio test, which is asymptotically
optimal (c.f. [15], [16]) but they do not consider specific
losses. Since in our case we have unequal losses ℓA and ℓU ,
we re-derive their threshold via a Bayesian test (to which a
Bayesian formulation of the Neymann-Pearson lemma [15]
applies) to obtain:
τ˜ =
n ln 1−pU1−pA − ln ρ
ln 1−pU1−pA − ln
pU
pA
. (16)
For equal losses, ρ = 1, and τ˜ equals the threshold used
in [14]. Such tests have good asymptotic properties [15], [17].
Interestingly, for small ∆, the form of τ˜ is similar to τˆ∗n: Let
p¯ such that pA = p¯+∆/2 and pU = p¯−∆/2. Then (16) can
be approximated by τ˜∗ = np¯ − p¯(1−p¯)∆ ln ρ. More details on
the derivation of (16) are given in Appendix B on page 7.
Figure 2 depicts the worst-case expected loss L as a
function of the actual noise ω. Figure 2(a) shows L using the
threshold τ derived from our expected loss analysis (7), while
in Figure 2(b) we use the asymptotically optimal threshold
of (16). In both cases, we plot L, while the actual noise ω
is changing, for a number of different cases. Initially, we
investigate the evolution of L for three arbitrarily chosen
values ωˆ ∈ {10−1, 10−2, 10−3}. Additionally, we examine the
evolution of the worst-case expected loss, when the noise is
empirically estimated ωˆ = θˆ/n and finally when pA and pU
are calculated via equation (15) with δ ∈ {10−1, 10−2}.
As it can be seen in Figure 2, in all cases (using ours
Figure 2(a) or Baigne`res et al. [14] threshold Figure 2(b))
the worst-case expected loss is very low for small values of
the actual noise and increases sharply when the actual noise
exceeds the value of 10−1. It is interesting to see that when we
use the optimistic3 high probability estimates for pA, pU , we
obtain almost always better performance than simply guessing
the noise, or using the plain empirical estimate ωˆ directly.
Furthermore, using the asymptotically optimal threshold (16),
we observe a deterioration in the results. Thus, our approach
results in a clearly dominating performance over other meth-
ods.
As mentioned in Sec. VI, the choice of the threshold by
Baigne`res et al. [14] is only asymptotically optimal. Ours,
while not optimal, gives a worst-case expected loss guarantee
for any finite sample size. Thus, it has better performance
when the asymptotic approximation is not sufficiently good,
which occurs when both the number of rounds n and the gap
∆ are small.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have performed the first, to our knowledge, expected
loss analysis of additive error challenge-response authentica-
tion protocols under channel constraints. Such an analysis
is necessary, because of the inherent cost of increasing the
number of rounds n and the need to trade off optimally the
3Experiments with pessimistic high probability estimates for the noise
showed a significant increase in the number of rounds used, which resulted
in a higher expected loss.
61
0.01 0.1
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 l
o
s
s
ω
ωˆ = 10−1
ωˆ = 10−2
ωˆ = 10−3
ωˆ = θ/k
δ = 10−1
δ = 10−2
(a) Our threshold
1
0.01 0.1
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 l
o
s
s
ω
ωˆ = 10−1
ωˆ = 10−2
ωˆ = 10−3
ωˆ = θ/k
δ = 10−1
δ = 10−2
(b) Asymptotic threshold
Fig. 2. The worst-case expected loss as a function of noise. We plot the evolu-
tion of the loss as noise changes, for a number of different cases. Firstly, for the
case where we arbitrarily assume a noise value ωˆ ∈ {10−1, 10−2, 10−3}.
Secondly, for an empirically estimated ωˆ = kˆ/n, and finally for pA, pU
calculated via equation (15) with δ ∈ {10−1, 10−2}.
costs of incorrectly authenticating an illegitimate entity, or
failing to authenticate a legitimate one, as well as the lack
of an error-free channel. In order to achieve this, we made the
assumption of bounds on the expected errors of a user and an
attacker. In addition, we assumed that these are independent
from errors in the previous rounds.4
The rapid-bit exchange phase considered in parts of this
paper was introduced in [3] to compute an upper bound on the
distance of the prover P from the verifier V . This is composed
of n challenge-response rounds, used to calculate a round-trip
time and thus place a bound on the distance. Subsequently,
a broad range of distance bounding protocols were proposed,
both for RFID [5], [7], [9]–[11], as well as other wireless
devices [6], [19], [20].
Hancke and Kuhn [9] were the first to indicate that since the
rapid-bit exchange phase is taking place in a noisy channel,
4Consequently, error probabilities drop exponentially fast, unlike the exam-
ples given in [18].
challenges and responses may be corrupted. Thus, a legitimate
user may fail to get authenticated. Their protocol (henceforth
HAKU), employed n rounds and authenticated any prover who
made a number of mistakes ε less than an acceptance threshold
τ , so as to reduce the number of false rejections. Using the
binomial distribution and an assumption on the error rates
they give expressions for the false accept and false reject
probability as a function of n and τ , but they provide no
further analysis. Nevertheless, they indicate that the number
of challenge-response rounds n in the rapid bit exchange
phase should be chosen according to the expected error rate.
Kim et al. [11] extend this approach with the SWISS-KNIFE
protocol by considering three types of errors. Finally [5], rather
than using a threshold τ , proposed a protocol (henceforth
ECMAD) using an error correcting code (ECC). ECMAD,
which extends the MAD protocol [19], uses only k of the n
total rounds for the challenges and responses. The remaining
n−k rounds are used to transmit the (n, k) ECC. This has the
effect of achieving better security (in terms of false acceptance
rates) with the same number of rounds n.
All these approaches use n rounds in the noisy authen-
tication phase. However, they do not define the optimal n.
They simply state that the probability of authenticating a user
becomes much higher than the probability of authenticating
an attacker as n increases. However, a large value of n
is incompatible with the requirements of many applications
and devices (i.e. high value of n leads to high overhead
for resource-constrained devices). This can be modelled by
assigning an explicit cost to every round, which should take
into account the transmission energy, computation and time
overhead. This cost has so far not been explicitly taken into
consideration.
Another work that is closely related to ours is [21], which,
given a required false acceptance and false rejection rate,
provides a lower bound on the number of required rounds. This
analysis is performed for both HAKU and ECMAD. However,
it assumes that the number of rounds n would be large enough
for the binomial distribution of errors to be approximately
normal. Our analysis is more general, since it uses finite-
sample bounds that hold for any bounded error function.
Recently, Baigne`res et al. [14] have given an analysis
on the related topic of distinguishing between a real and
a fake solver of challenge-response puzzles. More precisely,
they study CAPTCHA-like protocols and provide a threshold
which minimizes the probability of error in these protocols.
The main differences between the analysis presented in this
paper and [14] can be summarised below: (a) We perform an
expected loss analysis rather than an error analysis. (b) Our
bounds hold uniformly, while [14] uses an asymptotically op-
timal distinguisher. (c) We consider bounded errors rather than
{0, 1} errors for each challenge-response. (d) We additionally
propose a method to estimate channel noise. This is of course
not applicable in the context of [14], due to the different
setting.
A more general work on authentication under noisy condi-
tions was presented in [22]. This provided tight information-
7theoretic upper and lower bounds on the attacker’s success
in impersonation and substitution attacks, proving that it
decreased with noise. However, our analysis shows that, when
one considers losses due to communication overhead and false
rejections of users, the expected loss increases, which is a
natural result.
In this paper, we perform a detailed expected loss analysis
for a general class of additive-error authentication protocols
in a noisy channel. The analysis is performed by assigning a
loss ℓB to each round, and losses ℓA, ℓU to false acceptance
and false rejection respectively.
We show how a nearly-optimal threshold τˆ∗n for a given
number of rounds n can be chosen and give worst-case bounds
on the expected loss for that choice. Thus, the bounds hold no
matter if the party that attempts to get authenticated is either a
legitimate user U or an attacker A. This extends our previous
work [7], which proposed a new distance bounding protocol
(HITOMI) and only calculated a value for the threshold τ ,
without providing any bounds.
We also show how a nearly-optimal number of rounds nˆ∗
can be chosen and give further bounds on the expected loss.
The bounds hold for any bounded error function, and not only
for {0, 1} errors.5 Furthermore, they are valid for any n, since
they are based on probability inequalities for a finite number
of samples.6 Thus, they are considerably more general to the
bounds of [21].
Finally, we provided high-probability estimates for the
current noise level in the channel by leveraging the coding
performed in the initial and final phases of the protocol, which
takes place in a coded channel. This enables us to significantly
weaken assumptions on knowledge of the noise level in the
channel and in turn, provide an authentication algorithm which
has low expected loss with high probability. Experimentally,
we obtain uniformly superior results to guessing or direct
empirical noise estimates. Finally, we repeated those exper-
iments with an asymptotically optimal threshold similar to
that used by Baigne`res et al. [14]. Our results indicate a
significant improvement through the use of a threshold with
uniform, rather than asymptotic, guarantees. Consequently,
it is our view that algorithms motivated by an asymptotic
analysis should be avoided in the finite-sample regime of most
challenge-response authentication protocols.
Our analysis is particularly significant for areas of commu-
nications where challenges and responses are costly and where
there exists significant uncertainty about the correctness of any
single response.
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APPENDIX
A. Useful formulas
If X1, . . . , Xn are independent Bernoulli random variables
with Xk ∈ {0, 1} and P(Xk = 1) = µ for all k, then
P
(
n∑
k=1
Xk ≥ u
)
=
u∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
µk(1− µ)n−k. (17)
This probability can be bounded via Hoeffding’s inequality
[23]:
Lemma 3 (Hoeffding). For independent random variables
X1, . . . , Xn such that Xi ∈ [ai, bi], with µi , EXi and t > 0:
P
(
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥
n∑
i=1
µi + nt
)
≤ exp
(
− 2n
2t2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
P
(
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤
n∑
i=1
µi − nt
)
≤ exp
(
− 2n
2t2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
(18)
B. On Bayesian hypothesis tests
One way to obtain an asymptotically optimal threshold is to
employ a Bayesian hypothesis test [15]. This requires defining
a prior probability on the possible hypotheses. In our case, the
hypothesis set is H = {A,U}, on which we define a prior
probability π. For {0, 1} errors, the probability of observing
ε errors out of n observations is given by P(ε | A) and
P(ε | U) for the attacker and user respectively and it follows
a binomial distribution with parameters pA, pU respectively.
Given an observed error x, the posterior probability of any
hypothesis h ∈ H is:
π(h | ε = x) = P(ε = x | h)π(h)∑
h′∈H P(ε = x | h′)π(h′)
.
We then define a decision set G = {gA, gU}, where gA means
we decide that the prover is an attacker and gU means we
decide that the prover is a user. Finally, we define a loss
function L : G×H → R, such that L(g, h) is our loss when
we decide g and h is the correct hypothesis. The expected loss
of decision g ∈ G, under our prior and given ε errors out of
n is:
Epi(L | ε, g) =
∑
h∈H
L(g, h)π(h | ε),
where Epi denotes expectation with respect to the prior π. Now
define the decision function q : {0, 1, . . . , n} → G:
q(ε) ,
{
gU , if Epi(L | ε, gU ) ≤ Epi(L | ε, gA)
gA, if Epi(L | ε, gU ) > Epi(L | ε, gA).
(19)
This decision function minimises Epi L by construction (c.f.
[15] ch. 8). The following remark is applicable in our case:
8Remark 1. Assume i.i.d errors with εi ∈ {0, 1}, so that we
can use a binomial probability for P(ε | h). Set the loss
function L to be L(gU , A) = ℓA, L(gA, U) = ℓU and 0
otherwise. Then the decision function (19) becomes equivalent
to:
q(ε) ,
{
gU , if ε < τb
gA, if ε ≥ τb,
where
τb ,
n ln 1−pU1−pA − ln[ρ
pi(A)
pi(U) ]
ln 1−pU1−pA − ln
pU
pA
Proof: We start by calculating the expected loss for either
decision. First:
Epi(L | ε, gA) = ℓUπ(U | ε) = ℓUπ(U)P(ε | U)
π(A)P(ε | A) + π(U)P(ε | U) ,
due to our choice of L and π. Similarly,
Epi(L | ε, gU ) = ℓAπ(A | ε) = ℓAπ(A)P(ε | A)
π(A)P(ε | A) + π(U)P(ε | U) .
Combining the above expressions, the decision function (19)
can then be written so that we make decision gU if and only
if:
ℓAπ(A)P(ε | A) ≤ ℓUπ(U)P(ε | U).
Finally, replacing (17) with means pA, pU respectively and
taking logarithms we obtain:
ln[ρπ(A)/π(U)] + ε ln
pA
pU
≤ (n− ε) ln 1− pU
1− pA ,
as a condition for deciding gU . With some elementary manip-
ulations, we arrive at the required result.
Given the conditions of the previous remark, it is easy to
see (c.f. [15] ch. 8) that the decision function q minimises
the Bayes risk:
Epi(L | q) = π(A)P(ε < τb | A)ℓU + π(U)P(ε ≥ τb | U)ℓA.
(20)
Furthermore, for π(A) = π(U) = 1/2, we obtain (16). In
addition, this choice also minimises an upper bound on the
worst-case expected loss since:
max
h∈H
E(L | h, q) ≤
∑
h∈H
E(L | h, q) = 2Epi(L | q).
for uniform π.
Finally, the asymptotic optimality of Bayesian testing gen-
erally follows from Bayesian consistency (c.f. [15] ch. 10).
More specifically, [17] has proved the asymptotic optimality
of Bayes solutions for hypothesis testing of the type examined
here.
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